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Political Discrimination in the Aftermath of Violence: the case 
of the Greek riots 
 
David Hugh-Jones# , Alexia Katsanidou* and Gerhard Riener† 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We examine discrimination against outgroups in the context of the 
December 2008 riots in Greece after the killing of a 15-year-old student 
by a special police agent. We examine students’ allocations between 
themselves and others, including police, in modified Dictator games, 
allowing us to test theories of discrimination on behavior with real payoff 
consequences. Treatments examined the effect of in-group norms and 
environmental cues on discrimination. We find that cues in the 
environment increase discrimination. However, contrary to existing 
research, in-group norms do not increase discrimination. We also 
correlate discrimination with attitudes towards the riots themselves, 
providing a laboratory test of the “frame alignment” theory of 
mobilization. Laboratory behaviour was correlated with self-reported 
participation in demonstrations, supporting the external validity of our 
measure. 
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Political Discrimination in the Aftermath of Violence:  
the case of the Greek riots 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In December 2008, after the police killing of a 15-year-old schoolboy, Greece 
was shaken by a series of demonstrations, which swiftly turned violent. 
Participants fought the police and destroyed property. Although mass violence 
has subsided at the time of writing, terrorist attacks on Greek police have 
continued, and the December events continue to affect Greek politics and 
society.  
What makes people take action to harm those in other groups? Although large 
literatures in contentious politics and intergroup discrimination address these 
questions, clear answers are hard to come by. Psychological experiments have 
thrown light on the causes of discrimination, but have remained subject to 
concerns about external validity: can they really explain real-world behaviour? 
On the other hand, case studies of protest, riots and civil violence have led to 
interesting hypotheses, but have problems identifying causality. In this paper 
we use experimental methodology to test hypotheses from both strands in the 
literature, innovating in two ways. First, we used cash payoffs, so that the 
choice to discriminate had real monetary consequences for those involved. 
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Second, experiment participants were Greek students, allocating money 
between themselves and (among other groups) Greek police, in the charged 
atmosphere after the December 2008 riots. We could therefore validate our 
experimental results against participation in anti-police demonstrations.  
In particular we focus on three questions, derived from previous work (see 
Section 3). Our dependent variable is discrimination, by which we mean 
treating people worse because of their membership in a particular social group.  
• In discriminating, do individuals follow their own preferences? Or are 
they conforming to group norms? 
Recent work proposes that ethnic discrimination can be explained not by 
underlying preferences, but by the “technology of punishment” - that is, bad 
behaviour towards coethnics is more likely to be punished, for instance by loss 
of reputation within one’s social network (Habyarimana et al. 2007). An 
experiment in Bosnia found relatively low levels of intergroup discrimination 
in a dictator game where behaviour was private (Whitt and Wilson 2007). 
Similarly, some explanations of group conflict claim that only a minority of 
extremists actually desire violent conflict, but that they pressure other group 
members into joining in violent action (Hardin 1995). Social psychologists 
have suggested that outgroup discrimination takes place when norms 
preventing it are – sometimes deliberately – broken down (Bar-Tal 1990, 
Gaertner and Insko 2001, Staub 1990). Finally, recent experimental work on 
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the Dictator Game suggests that altruistic behaviour in general may be driven 
more by norms than by innate preferences (Dana et al. 2006).  
• Can discrimination be reinforced by cues in the environment? 
A large literature on civil war claims that hatred can be fomented by politicians 
acting instrumentally. The puzzle is to explain why people are affected by 
politicians’ speeches or prejudiced media coverage, when they should be aware 
of the underlying motivations. We propose that the mechanism is subconscious 
priming: cues in the environment, such as newspaper headlines, can awaken 
mistrust and aggression. We test this claim.  
• Is discrimination mediated by attributions of responsibility to opposing 
group members? 
That is, are subjects who blame individual members of the opposing group for 
a conflict situation more likely to behave antagonistically than those who 
instead blame chance or institutional structures? This question is motivated 
both by work on violence, in which blame is used to justify aggression, and by 
the literature on “frame alignment” for protest mobilization.  
To examine these questions, we run experiments in which students may 
allocate money between (1) themselves, (2) other anonymous recipients 
identified only by profession and (3) members of the Thessaloniki police force, 
identified only as police. Our treatments vary the publicity of subjects’ 
decisions, and expose them to different cues beforehand. Since Thessaloniki 
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was a center of anti-police activity, and since students were centrally involved, 
we have a rare opportunity to examine the aftermath of recent civil conflict. We 
build on an established tradition of examining intergroup behaviour using 
economic and psychological experiments (Tajfel et al. 1971, Tajfel 1982, 
Bouckaert and Dhaene 2004, Fershtman and Gneezy 2001a, Chen and Li 
2006). However, this is one of the first economic experiments to analyse 
behaviour between members of opposed political groupings.1 Our main 
findings are that environmental cues can indeed increase discrimination. On the 
other hand, in-group norms among students do not appear to have affected 
discrimination in our experiment, in contrast with the studies mentioned above. 
Indeed, there was clear evidence of discrimination even when choices were 
private. Lastly, blame attribution did not affect discrimination, suggesting that 
frame alignment and blaming have limited explanatory power in this case.  
In the next section, we describe the background of our experiment: the Greek 
riots of 2008, and contemporary Greek society. Section 3 describes the 
literature from which we derive our hypotheses. Section 4 sets out our design 
and Section 5 gives our results. 
 
                                                 
1The first, to our knowledge, is Fowler and Kam (2007), which examined giving to identified 
Democrats and Republicans in a dictator game.  
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2. Background: the 2008 Riots 
The December 2008 riots in Greece were the response to the killing of a 15-
year-old Athenian schoolboy by a special police agent. The outrage of a 
traditionally highly politicised society (Alivizatos 1990:137) escalated to a 
month-long conflict between the police and demonstrators, including both 
peaceful demonstrations and violent riots. Aggression against the police and 
other symbols of state and media power, such as university teachers and 
journalists, has continued in subsequent months.  
The violence demonstrates many Greeks’ anger towards government and state 
institutions. Public dissatisfaction with public administration, corruption and 
unsuccessful governance has for many years lacked an effective means of 
expression, due to Greece’s weak civil society (Mouzelis 1979: 19). The major 
parties themselves have provided the main alternative to civil society, being a 
major mobilizing force of the masses in the post-1974 era (Alivizatos 
1990:137) and dominating all social relations (Pridham 1990: 116). However, 
in recent years, disillusionment with the parties has grown, creating a 
representation gap. Greek politics combines new elements from after the 1974 
democratization with old practices of the pre-dictatorship era (Lyrintzis 1984: 
99-118; Samatas 1986: 35), which increases frustration. Politics was 
traditionally in the hands of a few strong families, and although after 1974 
entering politics became easier, the tradition of exclusivist parliamentarism 
remained and continues to oppose the democratization of politics (Mouzelis 
1979: 133). Thus, Greeks, particularly youngsters, judge their political system 
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as elitist, corrupt and inflexible, catering only for its own survival and 
reproduction instead of the country’s interests (Karamichas 2009: 291).  
The main target of the December 2008 protests was the police force. The public 
did not accept the explanation that the killing was the wrong-doing of one 
policeman but blamed the police force as a whole for allowing such individuals 
to operate in this manner through the institution. Thus the police was framed as 
both symptom and cause of political failure (Fetherstone 2009: 2). The Greek 
population’s lack of trust in the police force runs deep (Mouzelis 1979: 133), 
but is also constantly reinforced by the police’s inability to provide good 
services (Kathimerini 28/12/2008), and the fact that the police is seen as the 
shield of the establishment, the dominance of the major two parties. Before 
1974, the police were used by both dictatorships and elected Right-wing 
governments to keep the masses out of politics (Mouzelis 1979: 133; Veremis 
1997). Support for democracy was suppressed; the state employed family 
responsibility for “political crimes” to increase mass political surveillance 
using a vast network of police informers (Samatas 1986: 35). The police 
infiltration of private life provoked deep hatred. By 1974 the police force was 
composed mainly of anti-democratic individuals and junta sympathizers. The 
democratization of the state apparatus by the Karamanlis administration 
introduced no major reforms in order to avoid a backlash (Clogg 2002: 173; 
Clogg 1975: 338-42). This led to the disillusionment of ordinary Greek citizens 
with the police and the civil service (Kassimeris 2001: 262). The death of the 
school boy only added to this disillusionment increasing the number (eighteen 
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in total, mostly young males) of controversial deaths attributed to the police 
since the 1980s (Ios 2006).  
Thus, many Greek citizens identify the police with oppression rather than with 
the provision of security in a democratic country. Students are traditionally 
seen as a force of political change both by Greek society, as well as by 
themselves. Them being the major protest group in the December 2008 riots 
gives us a valuable opportunity for research into outgroup discrimination. The 
hatred and mistrust exhibited by students for police means that we can examine 
“outgroup hatred” in a strong form - something that is extremely hard to create 
with minimal groups in the lab. On the other hand, norms of fairness between 
ethnic groups, which are common in modern society and may regulate inter-
ethnic behaviour in many settings (Fearon and Laitin 1996), are more likely to 
be absent due to the political nature of the conflict. These norms may interfere 
with research if they especially affect behaviour under the eye of the 
experimenter. Indeed, experimental work with “home-grown” groups often 
finds weaker results than that with minimal groups (e.g. Habyarimana et al. 
2007, Whitt and Wilson 2007, Goerg et al. 2008; but cf. Bernhard et al. 2006). 
Finally, the political situation allows us to examine how social and political 
beliefs – in particular, blame attributions – affect motivations to harm outgroup 
members. 
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3. Existing Literature 
We examine discriminatory behaviour in the context of social conflict. Both 
discrimination and conflict have given rise to huge literatures. Social 
psychologists have examined discrimination in depth. The “minimal group” 
experiments of Tajfel and Turner (1981, 1971, 1982), and the Social Identity 
Theory developed to explain their results, have been particularly influential. 
The experiments seemed to show that individuals would willingly discriminate 
against outgroup members in a laboratory setting, even if the group was 
experimentally created and explicitly arbitrary, and membership knowledge 
was private. Social Identity Theory explains this as follows: individuals derive 
part of their sense of identity from belonging to groups. Discrimination against 
other groups can then be used to bolster or protect self-esteem by increasing the 
(subjective) value of one’s own group membership. Though Social Identity 
Theory has a solid track record of predicting laboratory behaviour, it has 
limitations. The logic works best as a theory of “ingroup love” rather than 
“outgroup hate”, and indeed it is hard to create discrimination in the lab when 
people are allocating negative payoffs (Mummendey et al. 1992, Brewer 1999). 
Other laboratory experiments have examined behaviour between real social 
groups. These face a potential “reverse experimenter demand effect”: becoming 
aware of the experiment’s purpose might trigger anti-discrimination norms, 
biasing findings against discrimination. Indeed, the evidence from such 
experiments is quite mixed (Habyarimana et al. 2007, Bernhard et al. 2006, 
Bouckaert and Dhaene 2004, Fershtman and Gneezy 2001b, McLeish and 
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Oxoby 2007, Whitt and Wilson 2007). In this context, using real, but non-
ethnic, social groups may be a useful approach.  
The literature on social conflict is equally large and diverse. Nevertheless, 
some key themes emerge. First, participation in conflict and violence, rather 
than being solely a matter of individual preferences, may be driven by norms in 
which a few extremists encourage or force others to participate (Kuran 1998, 
Hardin 1995). This is a widespread interpretation of the war in the former 
Yugoslavia, for example (Mueller 2000). Political scientists and psychologists 
agree that violence towards outgroups can be supported when norms which 
encourage it emerge (Horowitz 2001, Bhavnani 2006). Alternatively, the 
breakdown of norms which usually guard against aggression may also be 
important (Bar-Tal 1990, Bandura 2002). This is a compelling story, which we 
would like to test in a controlled fashion (cf. Habyarimana et al. 2007):  
Conjecture 1. Discrimination will be driven by norms, rather than by 
individual preferences, and will be most strongly present when individuals are 
subject to social pressure.  
Second, case studies repeatedly put part of the blame for outbreaks of violence 
on opportunistic behaviour by politicians, who use rhetoric to whip up tensions 
with the help of a compliant media (Oberschall 2001, 2000, Kaufman 2001, 
Ignatieff 1998, Bauerlein 2001). The puzzle in this story is to explain why 
people listen to a media they should know is biased, or to politicians whom 
they should expect to be opportunistic. One possible psychological mechanism 
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is that of “priming”. Reporting of violence on the media may affect people’s 
attitudes without them being fully aware of it. Again, we wish to test this 
mechanism in a controlled way.  
Conjecture 2. Discrimination will be increased by priming from cues in the 
environment.  
Another strand of the literature, focused on riots, activism and civil 
disobedience, takes a more optimistic view of conflict participants’ agency. 
Participation in conflict can be mediated by role identities and attributions of 
responsibility (Reicher 1996, Stott and Reicher 1998, Stott and Drury 2000, 
White 2001). Similarly, a large literature in the study of social movements 
claims that individuals’ “frames” (roughly, their interpretation of a particular 
situation) affect their willingness to support particular movements 
(Klandermans 1984, Snow et al. 1986, Gamson et al. 1982, Ferree and Miller 
1985). On this account, someone’s willingness to take action harming certain 
groups may be a form of expressive political action, and may depend on their 
attributions of blame for particular events or on their analysis of the situation as 
a whole.  
Conjecture 3. Discrimination will be mediated by individuals’ political and 
social views, including their attributions of responsibility.  
This literature also proposes that “frame alignment” – the process by which 
social movements bring individuals to subscribe to a collective frame 
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interpreting a situation – is a key step in mobilizing individuals to take part 
(Snow et al. 1986). This idea has received little experimental testing (but cf. 
Dardis 2007); in particular, we lack experimental evidence in which frame 
alignment is causally linked to costly actions with real consequences. Although 
the concept of framing is different from priming, the distinction is not absolute, 
and the frame-alignment process may be thought of as an interaction between 
environmental primes and the individual’s prior beliefs. This leads to our final 
conjecture:  
Conjecture 4. Individuals’ political and social views will have a stronger 
effect on discrimination in the presence of priming. 
 
4. Experimental Design 
We employed a 2× 2  factorial design, where we varied the publicity of the 
decisions and the primes administered. We applied these four treatments 
between subjcects. The experiment had two stages: in the first stage subjects 
were presented with a priming task that used either a neutral prime or a riot 
prime. In the second stage, subjects played a series of dictator games in which 
their decisions were either public or private (whether the subjects were in the 
private or the public treatment was determined before and did not change 
during the experiment. This was communicated to the subjects before they 
made any decisions). In each dictator game subjects could give money to 
people outside the lab, identified by their profession and gender. In these games 
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we varied the recipient (the other) and the relative price of giving to the other. 
After the actual experiment, subjects filled out a questionnaire. Table 1 gives 
an overview of the experimental design. We describe each stage in detail.2 All 
sessions were conducted by the same experimenters who took the same roles in 
each session. 
 
Priming Task 
Priming tasks are frequently used in psychological research to make a certain 
concept more salient (Bargh and Chartrand 2000; see e.g.Tajfel 1981, or 
Benjamin et al. forthcoming for an application to economics). As we were 
interested in the role of media in evoking discrimination, we asked subjects to 
read an article from a Greek newspaper and find spelling mistakes.3 Subjects 
had five minutes to complete the task. Half of the subjects read a neutral article 
about business activities of a large internet telephony company in Greece. The 
other half was presented with an article connected to the riots, containing a 
detailed description of the shooting of the 15-year old boy. Subjects were asked 
to count the spelling mistakes and rewarded €1 for getting the correct number 
(which was 10).  
 
Recipients 
The recipients were identified to the subject by profession and gender. To avoid 
inducing experimenter demand effects by making the police/other distinction 
                                                 
2
 The protocol and written instructions are available on request. 
3
 A translation of the articles (without spelling mistakes) can be found in the Appendix. 
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obvious, recipients were either police or members of one of 5 other professions: 
firefighter, private employee, civil servant, housewife and entrepreneur. 
Firefighters in particular provide a close comparison group with police, since 
both groups are uniformed state employees with a strong group identity. This 
allowed us to check whether our results come from general intergroup hostility, 
rather than specifically from discrimination against members of the police 
group. Furthermore, we were careful in how the professions were introduced in 
order that subjects see the profession as a group with which subjects can 
identify or not. Recipients were shown with invented names that preserved 
gender, and subjects were informed of this.  
 
Subjects 
Subjects were recruited via two methods: a) voluntary registration during 
lectures at the European and International Studies department and b) posters 
and leaflets distributed in and around the University of Macedonia and in the 
city centre. The subjects were aware of a minimum participation fee of 2.5 
Euro plus the potential of earning more, depending on their answers. 
Volunteers had to contact us by phone, email or in person to subscribe to the 
session of their choice and were informed that the sessions would run for an 
hour. At the beginning of each experiment subjects were shown a set of 
envelopes with the recipients’ names and addresses (concealed for identity 
protection reasons) and were told that at the end of the session the money 
allocated to each recipient would be posted in the envelope. A volunteer was 
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asked to witness the researchers taking the envelopes to the postbox. Subjects 
were constantly aware in all allocations of the amount of money they could 
keep or give to the recipients. They were informed that one of their money 
allocations would be picked at random as the final pay-off for them and the 
relevant recipient.4  
 
Dictator Game 
In a dictator game subjects are asked to split money between themselves and a 
recipient. Each subject played six turns of a modified dictator game - one for 
each profession. In each turn a profession was chosen randomly without 
replacement, and a recipient was chosen randomly from a pool of potential 
recipients of the chosen profession. The subject then made 9 decisions 
allocating money between him- or herself and the recipient. So every subject 
was presented with all of the six professions in random order.  
Motivated by analogous behaviour in civil conflict, we wished to learn how 
subjects behaved when discrimination carried a cost to the discriminator, and 
more generally how discrimination was affected by changes in its cost. 
Therefore, we varied the price of giving to the other person across the 9 
decisions.5 Subjects were shown a series of different budget sets, with payoff to 
oneself on the y-axis and payoff to the recipient on the x-axis, and were asked 
                                                 
4
 As there is no reason to believe that the credibility of the experimentors is different by treatment, the 
treatment effects should be unaffected by credibility concerns. In the post-experimental questionnaire, 
we asked, whether subjects trusted the experimentor to send the money. Answer could be given on a 
scale from 1-7, where 1 is “Not at all” and 7 “Very much”. The average responses by treatment were: 
riot/pivate: 6.02 riot/public: 6.06 neutral/pivate: 5.70 neutral/public 5.60. The differences are not 
significantly different from 0 at a 10% significance level using rank-sum tests. 
5
 For a similar approach see Andreoni and Miller (2002) or Fisman et al. (2007). 
  15 
to pick a point on the boundary of the budget set, as shown in Figure 1. (Before 
the actual task, subjects made a non-paid trial choice to ensure that the setup 
was well understood.) After a point was chosen, the resulting allocation was 
shown in figures in the top right corner of the screen. If the subject was 
satisfied with the decision taken, she could confirm the choice. There were 
three different kinds of budgets. Four were standard budget sets crossing the x-
axis at 7.5 or 15, and the y axis at 7.5 or 15. Thus, the price to give to the other 
person was either 0.5, 1 or 2 and the own endowment was either 7.5 or 15. One 
budget set had a zero price of giving: the set crossed the y-axis at 7.5, 
continued to (7.5,7.5) and then dropped to cross the x-axis at 7.5. Three budget 
sets had a negative price of giving, i.e. it was actually costly not to give to the 
other. These started at the origin, and went to either (7.5,7.5), (7.5, 15) or 
(15,7.5), so that the price of not giving was 0.5, 1 or 2. This is the closest 
laboratory analogue to behavior, such as participation in riots, that has costs to 
the actor as well as to the potential victims.  
Figure 1: Examples of Budget Sets. 
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The final budget set in each term was step-shaped (see Figure 2). The step-
shaped budget set is suitable for detecting some prototypical forms of other-
regarding preferences in a non-parametric way, as choices within certain 
subsets on the budget line have a direct interpretation in terms of social 
preferences.  
Figure 2: Step Shaped Budget Set. 
 
Note: Diagram labels and emphasized points were not shown on the experimental screen. 
 
Subjects who choose Increase difference want to maximize the difference 
between their income and the income of the recipient. Selfish describes subjects 
who choose the highest possible outcome for themselves but, given this choice, 
do not maximize the payoff of the other. Lexself subjects maximizes their 
payoff and then the payoff of the other. Inequality averse subjects will forego 
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their own profit in order to reduce inequality. The egalitarian point indicates 
strong preferences for fairness. Points to the right of this point indicate other-
damaging behavior on the horizontal line, and self-damaging behavior on the 
vertical line.  
 
Private and Public Treatments 
Half the subjects were in the public treatment, half in the private. In the public 
treatment, after the dictator games, one set of decisions was chosen and 
displayed to a single neighbour of the subject; pairs of neighbours were then 
asked to chat (using the zTree interface) about their decisions for three minutes. 
In the private treatment, decisions were anonymous and could not be connected 
to subjects’ real identities by experimenters. In both cases, subjects were 
informed of this in advance.  
 
Questionnaire 
The questionnaire started with open questions on the content of the experiment, 
in order to check for potential demand effects - a concern that subject alter their 
behavior because they know the purpose of the experiment. Along with 
demographics, the questionnaire included questions on attachment to the 
student identity, the attribution of blame for the riots, and participation in 
demonstrations and riots. 
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Table 1: Structure of the experiment. 
   
I  Introduction and Explanation of Experiment  
   
II  Neutral Prime  Riot Prime  
III Example for choice on the budget sets  
 Treatments stratified over primes  
   
 Decisions Private Decisions Public  
   
IV Profession chosen at random without replacement out of six professions  
V  Choice on linear budget set chosen randomly without  
replacement out of 9 different  
 Return to V nine times  
VI Choice on step-shaped budget set  
 Return to IV six times  
   
 Post experimental questionnaire  
 
Hypotheses 
We operationalize our conjectures as follows, using a simple aggregate 
measure of discrimination: was giving significantly lower to the police than to 
other groups? First, since norms affect behaviour by imposing costs on those 
who publicly violate them, Conjecture 1 leads to:  
Hypothesis 1: giving to police will be lower in the public treatment.  
Conjecture 2 similarly gives us  
Hypothesis 2: giving to police will be lower in the riot prime treatment.  
Finally, we use the questionnaire to test whether discriminatory behaviour is 
correlated with expressed political beliefs, and whether this interacts with the 
effect of cues, as in Conjectures 3 and 4.  
Hypothesis 3: giving to police will be lower among subjects who blame 
the police for the shooting, and those who lay blame on individual 
policemen rather than on institutional structures.  
 
Hypothesis 4: the police-other giving difference among subjects who 
blame the police for the shooting will be larger in the riot prime 
treatment. 
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5. Results 
Experiments were conducted from April 8 to April 11, 2009 at the University 
of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece in 9 sessions.6 The sessions were held in 
the computer laboratory of the Economics Faculty, with adaptations for running 
computerized experiments.7 In total 184 subjects participated; the number of 
subjects per session varied between 12 and 28. 58.6% of the subjects were 
female. 20.2% of the women and 30.9% of the men stated that they participated 
in demonstrations connected to the events in December, but nobody admitted 
taking violent actions. The experiment lasted around one hour. The average 
payment (including show-up fee and rewards for correct guesses) was about €10.  
Table 2 shows average allocations to the different professions by treatment 
over all budget sets. The first observation we make is that giving when the 
decision is observed increases giving to the other by around 50€c (t-test, p-
value < 0.001). In contrast, there is no significant difference between the riot 
and the neutral prime over all profession types. 
In the private treatment, when subjects received the neutral prime, policemen and 
entrepreneurs received the lowest average contributions. In the riot prime, the 
donation to the policemen was lower at 4.01 while the contributions to the other 
professions increased (or stayed nearly the same as in the case of the civil servant). In 
the public treatment, the riot prime decreased contributions for all profession types.  
                                                 
6
 Due to the fact that April 11 was a Saturday, we might have selection effects. We have too few 
observations on Saturday (38 in total in four treatments) to explicitly test for selection effects. 
However, our results are robust to the exclusion of the Saturday session (available upon request). 
7
 Photographs are available on request. 
  20 
Table 2: Average giving over all budget sets (pooled) by treatments. 
 Treatment   
      
 Private  Public   
      
 Neutral  Riot  Neutral  Riot  Total 
Profession  €  €  €  €  €  
      
- Policeman  4.16 (0.17) 4.01 (0.16) 5.08 (0.15) 4.92 (0.17) 4.53  
[All non-police] 4.41 (0.07) 4.66 (0.07) 5.00 (0.07) 4.90 (0.08) 4.74  
- Civil servant  4.27 (0.16) 4.26 (0.15) 4.63 (0.15) 4.87 (0.17) 4.49  
- Private 
employee 
4.41 (0.16) 4.62 (0.15) 5.06 (0.15) 4.81 (0.17) 4.73  
- Housewife  4.86 (0.16) 5.07 (0.15) 5.48 (0.15) 5.34 (0.16) 5.18  
- Entrepreneur  3.90 (0.17) 4.25 (0.15) 4.47 (0.16) 4.24 (0.17) 4.22  
- Firefighter  4.62 (0.16) 5.12 (0.15) 5.37 (0.15) 5.24 (0.16) 5.09  
      
Total  4.37  4.56  5.01  4.90   
      
Note: Standard error of means in parenthesis . 
 
We now turn to the issue of discrimination against policemen in the different 
treatments. Table 3 reports donations to police vs non-police recipients in the 
different treatments. There is a significant difference for decisions made in the 
private, riot prime treatment. To investigate this further, we run OLS egressions 
on giving to others, using clustered robust standard errors for inference, where 
the cluster is the individual. Table 4 reports the results. Riot and Public are 
dummies for the riot prime and public treatments respectively.  
 
Table 3: Average giving over budget sets with positive prices by treatment. 
    
Treatment  Neutral/Private Neutral/Public ∆
  
    
Non-police  2.75  3.39  -0.64 (0.00)  
Police  2.60  3.67  -1.06 (0.00)  
    
∆
  
0.15 (0.42)  -0.28 (0.17)   
 
Riot/Private Riot/Public ∆
  
   
3.25  3.73  -0.48 (0.03)  
2.56  3.64  -1.08 (0.00)  
   
0.69 (0.01)  0.09 (0.65)  
 
Treatment  Neutral  Riot  ∆
  
    
Non-police  3.08  3.46  0.38 (0.57)  
Police  3.15  3.04  -0.11 (0.15)  
    
∆
  
-0.07 (0.75) 0.43 (0.02)  
Note: p-values of rank-sum test in parentheses H0  : Differences are equal to 0. 
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Table 4. Policeman vs Others 
     
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 Non-zero prices  Positive prices  Negative prices  Zero price  
     
Price 0.802***(0.0781) -2.333*** (0.155) 2.342*** (0.0844)  
Endowment -0.0755*** (0.014) 0.270*** (0.016) -0.0642** (0.023)  
Riot 0.201 (0.254) 0.502 (0.460) -0.199 (0.309) 0.471 (0.428) 
Public 0.517 (0.275) 0.640 (0.448) 0.350 (0.288) 1.158 **(0.404) 
Police -0.154 (0.199) -0.146 (0.242) -0.166 (0.202) -0.711 (0.393) 
Riot ×  public -0.188 (0.362) -0.159 (0.633) -0.225 (0.436) -1.159* (0.583) 
Police ×  public 0.278 (0.235) 0.427 (0.314) 0.0818 (0.257) 0.668 (0.512) 
Police ×  riot -0.381 (0.297) -0.547 (0.340) -0.161 (0.326) -0.220 (0.575) 
Police ×  riot ×  
public 0.363 (0.355) 0.173 (0.449) 0.614 (0.409) -0.206 (0.769) 
downward -4.627*** (0.336)    
Constant 7.527*** (0.319) 2.339*** (0.376) 9.511*** (0.394) 5.353*** (0.348) 
     
Combined 
coefficient     
Police + police ×  
riot -0.536** (0.221) -0.692*** (0.241) -0.327 (0.256) -0.931**  (0.420) 
Police + police x 
public 0.124 (0. .125) 0.281 (0.200) -0.083 (0.158) -0.042 (0.328) 
Police + police ×  
public + police ×  
riot. + police ×  
public ×  riot 
.105 (0.149) -.092 (0.214) 0.369 (0.190) -0.468 (0.391) 
     
Observations  7607  4348  3259  1087  
R2
  
0.2278  0.0989  0.3178  0.0365  
     
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Baseline: decision private, neutral cue, non-police 
recipient; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001. 
 
The regression analysis shows the effect of prices and endowments. While for 
positive prices these effects go in expected directions, i.e. higher prices reduce 
giving to the other and higher endowment increases it, the effect of endowment 
on giving goes in an unexpected direction: the higher the endowment 
(measured in terms of the maximum that a subject could give to herself), the 
lower the willingness to contribute, even controlling for the price. This also 
drives the aggregate results in the column (1) of table 4.  
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The effects of both priming and publicity treatments on giving to non-police do 
not reach significance, except for the public treatment effect when prices are 
zero. For the publicity treatment this is surprising, as these findings are not in 
line with previous research on social distance and other-regarding behavior (for 
early evidence in simple dictator games see Hoffman et al. (1996)). The fact 
that recipients are not present in the laboratory may have dampened the effect 
of publicity.8  
We also construct a measure of individual discrimination by taking the 
difference between giving to the police and average giving to the other 
professions over all budget sets. The average difference in the private 
treatments under the neutral cue is 0.26€ while this difference increases to 
0.73€ under the riot cue (rank-sum test, p-value: 0.14). In the public treatments 
we only see an increase in this difference from 0.01 to 0.06. This increase is not 
significantly different from zero (rank-sum test, p-value: 0.45).  
Examining the Police dummies – and their crosses with different treatments – 
and the result on the measures of individual discrimination gives our main 
results.  
Result 1   Discrimination against police is not significantly different between 
the public and private treatments.  
                                                 
8
 Findings that donations to a third party outside the lab are higher when identity is reported to a subject 
within the lab have been found - to the best of our knowledge - only in research on charitable giving. 
See for example Reinstein and Riener (2009) in the context of charities. 
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The combined coefficient of police plus police ×  public is not significantly 
different from zero. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is not supported. Indeed, the next result 
shows that if anything, publicity lessens discrimination.  
Result 2   Discrimination against police is higher in the riot prime treatment, 
but only when decisions are private.  
Table 5: Preference Types elicited from Choices on the Step Shaped Set (in percent) 
         
Preference 
type  
Private  Public  
         
 Neutral  Riot  Neutral  Riot  
 
        
 Police Not police Police Not police Police Not police Police Not police 
 
        
 % of subjects in category  
         
Competitive 13.33 10.67  25.00 8.57  4.17  3.72  13.16 11.40  
Egoistic  26.67 18.22  18.75 12.24  14.58 13.22  13.16 11.92  
Lexicograph
ic self  
35.56 47.56  29.17 41.22  45.83 58.26  34.21 33.16  
Egalitarian  4.44  9.33  2.08  6.12  10.42 5.37  10.53 8.29  
Equity  11.11 5.78  20.83 17.55  18.75 11.57  15.79 21.24  
Other 
damaging  6.67 6.22 4.17 12.65 6.25 10.42 13.16 11.92 
Self 
damaging  2.22 2.22 0 1.63 0 0 0 2.07 
         
Pearson’s 
χ ²
 -test 
5.45 (0.49) 17.17 (0.01) 4.57 (0.47) 1.61 (0.95) 
         
Note: p-value in parentheses. 
 
The combined coefficient of police plus police ×  riot is significantly different 
from zero and negative. Thus, Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected for private 
decisions. However, publicity appears to eliminate the effect of the riot prime, 
since the combined coefficient police + riot ×  police + police ×  public + riot 
×
 police ×  public is not significantly different from 0. Table 5 gives further 
support for result 2 for the step-shaped budget set. We categorized subjects’ 
choices on the step-shaped set by their corresponding prototypical social 
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preferences, as described above.The distributions of social preference types for 
police and non-police recipients are significantly different ( χ 2  -test, p-value: 
0.01) in the private, riot prime treatment. In particular, subjects are much more 
likely to show competitive preferences towards police than to non-police. In the 
other three treatment combinations we do not observe this difference.  
Table 6: Giving to police and controlling for blame for riots. 
     
 Private  Public  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 Neutral  Riot  Neutral  Riot  
     
Blame      
... state  -1.062  -0.579  0.488  -0.261  
 (0.758)  (0.731)  (0.690)  (0.855)  
... police leadership  0.412  -2.092*** 0.860  0.0783  
 (0.905)  (0.663)  (0.762)  (0.877)  
... police  -1.614** -1.892  -0.0583  2.646  
 (0.795)  (1.229)  (1.361)  (1.817)  
... anarchists  0.999  0.415  -0.514  0.427  
 (0.886)  (0.641)  (0.836)  (0.920)  
... media  1.053  -0.385  0.523  0.825  
 (0.976)  (0.597)  (0.757)  (1.048)  
... government  0.422  2.301***  -1.430  0.379  
 (1.153)  (0.596)  (1.038)  (0.940)  
... students  -0.905  -1.442  0.685  -1.065  
 (1.374)  (1.338)  (1.333)  (1.087)  
... other  3.687**  0.638  -1.390  -0.250  
 (1.736)  (0.718)  (1.073)  (0.896)  
... nobody  0  3.251***  0  1.800*  
 (.)  (0.625)  (.)  (0.896)  
Constant  1.476  3.439***  3.342*** 3.000*** 
 (0.969)  (0.803)  (0.919)  (0.896)  
     
Observations  180  192  192  152  
R2
  
0.1672  0.3020  0.0604  0.0705  
     
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors. Cluster: subject. Results for downward sloping 
budget sets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Table 6 reports giving to police separated by treatments and controlling for 
blame attributions. In the private treatment using the neutral cue, we find a 
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strong and significant correlation between giving to police and blame attributed 
to police. In the riot treatments there is still negative correlation of the blame 
attribution to the police and giving to the police, but this is not statistically 
significant. However, blaming the police leadership is significantly negatively 
correlated with giving to police. In the public treatment, blame attributions are 
not correlated with giving to police forces.  
Result 3   Those who blame the police for the riots do discriminate 
significantly more against the police when the decisions are made privately. 
There is no difference whether subjects received the neutral or the riot 
treatment. We do not find these correlations in the public treatment.  
Thus, Hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected. Anti-police discrimination is significantly 
correlated with individuals’ expressed attribution of blame to the police. The public 
treatments show null results: possibly the social norm of giving is stronger than the 
desire to express blame, or subjects are afraid to express their antagonism in front of 
another participant whose political views are unknown. On the other hand, the riot 
treatment did not significantly increase the effect of blame, so that Hypothesis 
4Error! Reference source not found. is rejected.  
 
5.1. Participation in Demonstrations 
Laboratory behaviour can be accurately measured, but does it correlate with 
behaviour in the real world? To address these concerns, our questionnaire 
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included measures of participation in the demonstrations. We examine how 
discrimination correlates with these self-reports.  
Around 23% of our subjects participated in the demonstrations. Table 7 shows 
average donations by treatments and groups. We see very clear and significant 
discrimination against police among subjects who participated in the demonstrations, 
but only in the private treatment. The discrimination is stronger in the riot prime 
treatment. In the public treatment, we do not see discrimination. In contrast, the group 
of subjects who did not take part in the demonstrations do not appear to discriminate 
against the police, except in the private treatment when they have been primed with 
the riot cue.  
Table 7: Average giving over budget sets with positive prices by treatment. 
     
Participated in demonstrations  
     
 Neutral/Private Neutral/Public Riot/Private Riot/Public  
     
Non police  2.98  3.34  4.15  2.12  
Police  1.98  3.85  2.46  1.69  
∆
  
1.00 (0.053)  -0.51 (0.240)  1.69 (0.007) 0.434 (0.32)  
     
     
Not participated in demonstrations  
     
 Neutral/Private Neutral/Public Riot/Private Riot/Public  
     
Non police  2.67  3.43  3.02  4.22  
Police  2.80  3.52  2.58  4.30  
∆
  
-0.13 (0.660)  -0.08 (0.780)  0.44 (0.100) -0.08 (0.830) 
     
Note: Rank-sum test for differences. p-value in parenthesis.  
We also examined whether subjects who showed greater antagonism towards 
the police - those subject who chose the competitive point in the step-shaped 
budget set - were more likely to have been involved in the demonstrations. 
Estimating a linear probability model with participation in demonstrations on 
the left hand and the preference type on the right hand side of the equation, we 
find that those with competitive preferences were significantly more likely to 
participate in the demonstrations (results available on request).  
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It could be that subjects misreported their participation in demonstrations so as 
to justify their behaviour in the experiment. We cannot rule this out completely. 
However, as a robustness check we examined whether the answers on 
participation were different between the treatments. If self-justification 
explained the answers, we would expect that the effect of the treatment on 
giving would be reflected in the answers. Fortunately, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the distribution of answers are equal (publicity treatments: χ 2  -
test, p-value: 0.141, cueing treatments: χ
2
 -test, p-value: 0.797).  
We expected to find that subjects who participated in the demonstrations gave 
less to the police in the upward sloping budget sets, but this was not the case. 
So, although participation was linked to laboratory behavior, we could not 
replicate the kind of behaviour that has material costs and risks, such as 
participation in political protest. Further work with a more selected group of 
subjects might address this issue. 
 
5.2. Debriefing 
A concern in psychological experiments is that participants may behave in 
ways they think the experimenters want. This makes it important that 
participants do not guess the purpose of the experiment. Priming tasks can be a 
particular area of concern (Bargh and Chartrand 2000). By including multiple 
social groups as recipients, and by presenting the article primes as a spelling 
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task, we aimed to avoid this. As a check, our questionnaire included open 
questions on the experiment topic. No participant mentioned the police or the 
December 2008 disturbances. 
 
6. Discussion 
A large body of literature on conflict proposes that outgroup hatred can be 
whipped up by media and elite rhetoric. We were able to reproduce this effect 
in the lab. Subjects exposed to an inflammatory newspaper article gave 
significantly less to police than to others in a dictator game. This opens the way 
to more in-depth study of the media’s effect on preferences - an important 
research topic given the role played by media in some recent episodes of 
conflict and genocide.  
On the other hand, we were not able to support the claim that discrimination is 
driven by norms. Indeed, discrimination was more evident in private than in 
public. Our result contrasts with recent work that has proposed a major role for 
norms, and a relatively minor one for individual preferences, in driving 
discrimination. However, the findings of these inter-ethnic laboratory 
experiments may have been biased, since subjects were aware they were being 
observed by the experimenter, and since there is in fact a widespread norm 
against ethnically-based discrimination. In any case, either existing work is 
mistaken in making social norms so important to discrimination, or norms take 
effect in some way which our experiment did not capture. For example, 
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ingroup norms may only become activated during brief periods of conflict; or 
our subjects may not have been sure enough of the beliefs of their fellow 
students.  
Laboratory experiments will always face questions of external validity. While 
we have no panacea for these concerns, we were able to link behaviour in the 
experiment to self-reported participation in demonstrations. It is possible that 
subjects lied or misremembered their own actions, but we think the simple 
explanation that there was a genuine correlation with real-world behaviour is 
more likely, especially as reported participation levels did not vary between 
treatments.  
Our laboratory results cannot explain the causes of the December 2008 riots in 
Greece. However, we can infer some statements about discrimination and its 
triggers among Greek students. First and foremost, we found no indication of 
the existence of a strong political student identity, governed by in-group norms. 
Students come from different backgrounds and have diverse opinions about the 
events of December 2008, which in the end matter more than their participation 
in the student community. Students were reluctant to discriminate in the public 
treatment, perhaps because they feared the disapproval of fellow participants 
whose political views were unknown. Although students are not a homogenous 
body, demonstration participants discriminated more against police than others, 
suggesting that political participation is linked to individual attitudes for at least 
some. Finally, the role of the media within the Greek society should not be 
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underestimated. Subjects who read the inflammatory article on the riots 
discriminated more against the police. Thus we can infer that the media can 
have a great impact in shaping individual preferences and potentially 
discrimination between groups within Greece.  
Where to go from here? Our experiment supports the idea that cues from the 
media can affect people’s behaviour towards others. More generally, we 
believe that experimental work will become increasingly important in studying 
the motivations behind political protest, contentious politics and even civil 
conflict. Both field and laboratory experiments have a role. A key issue will be 
defining and finding the population of interest. We also hope that our work will 
generate interest in linking experimental and case-study approaches to these 
issues. As our experiment shows, the insightful hypotheses provided by 
qualitative work can be tested experimentally. 
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Appendix: Newspaper Articles 
A.1 Neutral: Skype comes to your iPhone (Taken from Kathimerini 
30/03/2009)9 
The famous phone service provider using computer “Skype” plans its 
adaptation for mobile phones such as iPhone and Blackberry, scheduled for 
March. Skype has been trying for a while now to make its services compatible 
with the most advanced mobile phones in the market. In an attempt to expand 
its current user base, reaching 400 million people, skype offered low cost and 
occasionally free calls. Skype manager, Scott Darslang, did not hide his great 
expectations for the success of adaptation on the iPhone, considering it a great 
piece of technology very compatible with skype services. “The most important 
request from our users is the transfer of our service on the iPhone, and this 
demand is constantly rising”, commented Darslang in his recent interview. 
Even thought video-calls are the most famous functions of skype, the company 
has not made clear yet if this function will be available on the iPhone. “We are 
very careful when it comes to quality”, explained Darslang and he pointed out 
that they have to first make sure that it can wok without mistakes, before 
incorporating it in the iPhone package.  
Source:http://portal.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_kathworld_1_30/03/2009
_ 273107.  
 
A.2 Riot: The constitution and the blood  (Abstract from an article of Pantelis 
Boukalas Kathimerini 9/12/2008)10  
December 2008. Exarchia. A special police agent, called “Rambo” by his 
colleagues, kills the high school student Alexandros Grigoropoulos; the bullet 
hits the fifteen-year-old in the chest. The tens of protest voices on television, 
the internet do not let the police to pass the scenario of “policemen in defence” 
and “emotional turbulence”. Eyewitnesses confirm that the policemen shot cold 
blooded the boy following an insignificant verbal incident, and immediately 
after he left with his colleague leaving the boy to die. Students across the 
country shocked by their brother’s murder protested in anger. Fully aware and 
bitter that their voice will not be heard they left books (Ancient Greek, 
Literature, Maths, everything a child reads) and flowers on the “unknown 
soldier” monument in front of the Greek parliament. In between the books we 
might see a copy of our constitution with underlined two points: Article 2.1: 
“The respect and protection of the value of the human being are a major 
responsibility of the State”. Article 5.2 “Everyone residing in Greece enjoys the 
full protection of their life, honour and freedom”. The students have underlined 
this “everyone”. With their blood.  
Source:http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_columns_2_09/12/2008_2
95314 .
                                                 
9
 Translated by Alexia Katsanidou. 
10
 Translated by Alexia Katsanidou. 
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